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INCOMPLETE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
-APPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY
Tae Jung Park*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) was
signed on November 15, 2020.1 A perusal of the agreement reveals that
its investment chapter appears to have a serious oversight: it is missing
investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) provisions. 2 The member
states agreed on the investment protection clause but failed to agree on
ISDS provisions. Instead, they inserted a renegotiation clause to complete
these terms after ratifying the treaty. Likewise, the China–Australia Free
Trade Agreement (“FTA”) lacks several articles addressing investment
protection, such as clauses addressing expropriation and the minimum
standard of treatment. 3 Although this may impair the ability to attract

* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Incheon National University, South Korea. Formal Legal
Advisor in the International Legal Affairs division of the Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, and
former Investment and Services Treaty Negotiator in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy,
Republic of Korea. The views or opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the
views or opinions of the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy of the Republic
of Korea. This article is elaborated and developed from the author’s recently published book titled
“Incomplete International Investment Agreements: Problems, Causes and Solutions.” This work was
supported by Incheon National University Research Grant in 2022. All remaining errors and
misconceptions are the author’s responsibility.
1. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, Nov. 15, 2020, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/6032/download
[hereinafter RCEP.
2. See id. at art. 10.18 (discussing renegotiation in the context of investment disputes). Article
10.18: Work Programme
1. The Parties shall, without prejudice to their respective positions, enter into discussions on:
(a) the settlement of investment disputes between a Party and an investor of another Party;
and
(b) the application of Article 10.13 (Expropriation) to taxation measures that constitute
expropriation,
no later than two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the outcomes of
which are. subject to agreement by all Parties. The Parties shall conclude the discussions
referred to in paragraph 1 within three years from the date of commencement of the
discussions.
3. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government
of the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 9.9, June 17, 2015, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/3454/download.
3. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Parties shall commence negotiations on a
comprehensive Investment Chapter, reflecting outcomes of the review referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2, immediately after such review is completed. The negotiations shall
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) amendments to Articles included in this Chapter;
(b) the inclusion of additional Articles in this Chapter, including Articles addressing:
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foreign investment, both parties decided not to insert investment
protection terms. Instead, they included a renegotiation clause.
The RCEP member states of China and Australia are not the only
countries that have failed to complete their international investment
agreements (“IIAs”). India and Japan also concluded an incomplete IIA.4
Further, various Latin American countries5 and New Zealand similarly
concluded incomplete IIAs.6
More concerningly, these countries opportunistically postpone
renegotiations to complete IIAs. For instance, India and Singapore agreed
to renegotiate the reservation list, but the parties are yet to complete their
renegotiations despite the fifteen years that have lapsed since the
conclusion of the IIA. Likewise, India and Japan agreed to upgrade the
terms more than nine years ago, but the parties are yet to fulfill their
promises to renegotiate.
This Article employs incomplete contract theory to explain the
aforementioned states’ behaviors. For instance, the Article examines why
countries leave incomplete provisions and postpone renegotiation and
how countries discourage other parties’ opportunistic postponement.
This study makes two principal contributions to the existing literature.
First, it introduces a rather new phenomenon: how states’ behaviors are
associated with incomplete IIAs. This study develops a typology of
incomplete IIAs, explains the reasons for high transaction costs in
completing IIAs, and provides a practical remedy to tackle these issues.
Second, the Article addresses how incomplete contract theory could
explain the states’ behaviors associated with incomplete IIAs. The
incomplete IIA issue is a widely known phenomenon among treaty
negotiators, but it has garnered little attention in academic literature.
Although Alan O. Sykes laid out the foundation of the economic structure

(i) Minimum Standard of Treatment;
(ii) Expropriation;
(iii) Transfers;
(iv) Performance Requirements;
(v) Senior Management and Board of Directors;
(vi) Investment-specific State to State Dispute Settlement; and
(vii) The application of investment protections and ISDS to services supplied through
commercial presence]
4. See Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of
India, Japan-India, Feb. 16, 2011 (unpublished), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/epa20110
2/pdfs/ijcepa_ba_e.pdf.
5. See, e.g., International Investment Agreements Navigator: Ecuador, INVESTMENT POLICY
HUB (last visited April 20, 2022), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/countries/61/ecuador (listing IIAs between Ecuador and other countries).
6. See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (With Exchange of
Notes), China-New Zealand, Nov. 22, 1988, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationa
l-investment-agreements/treaty-files/764/download.
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of IIAs,7 and Anne van Aaken applied the incomplete contract theory in
the field of IIAs, 8 subsequent literature has yet to focus on how
incomplete contract theory can shed light on states’ behaviors regarding
incomplete IIAs.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II introduces the theoretical
background, exploring the literature on applying incomplete contract
theory to IIAs and explaining incomplete contract theory. Section III
classifies four types of incomplete IIAs, and Section IV applies the
incomplete contract theory to the context of incomplete IIAs. Section V
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Literature Review on Applying Incomplete Contract Theory to
IIAs
Literature on the economic analysis of IIAs is still in early stages.
Previous studies have predominantly focused on the role of IIAs in
managing expropriation and regulatory activities.9 Recently, Sykes laid
the foundation of the economic structure of IIAs by arguing that it serves
a dual economic function to: (1) discipline the host country policies that
impose international externalities on foreign investors and (2) curtail
inefficient risks associated with agency costs, risk aversion, asymmetric
information, and time-inconsistency issues, which increases the costs of
receiving foreign capital to host countries.10
Based on these findings by previous studies, van Aaken took the first
step in applying incomplete contract theory in the world of IIAs.11 She
argues that a soft term or gap is better than a hard term because hard terms
are less open to interpretation and will always be suboptimal after a period
of time.12 Once conditions change, a contract with a hard term will lead
7. Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements with
Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 482 (2019).
8. Anne Van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A
Contract Theory, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Thomas Tangeräs, Economics and Politics of International
Investment Agreements (Research Inst. of Indus. Econ.,Working Paper No. 1140, 2017); Emma Aisbett
& Jonathan Bonnitcha, A Pareto-Improving Compensation Rule for Investment Treaties (U. of New S.
Wales Law Research Paper No. 18-80, 2018); Emma Aisbett et al., Police Powers, Regulatory Takings
and the Efficient Compensation of Domestic and Foreign Investors, 86 ECON. RECORD 367 (2010);
JONATHAN BONNITCHA ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 127-154
(2017).
10. Sykes, supra note 7, at 482.
11. Van Aaken, supra note 8, at 507 (arguing that contract theory could be utilized in international
investment law in a similar way to how the theory is used in international trade law).
12. Id. at 517.
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to outcomes that are less desirable than the parties would have agreed
upon, had they known of the uncertainties in advance. Thus, van Aaken
argues gaps, such as escape or exception clauses, should be inserted to
compensate for an unpredictable future.
Wolfgang Alschner observes first-generation investment treaties,
usually BITs, are incomplete contracts involving only vague provisions
and delegating much of the gap-filling to tribunals, whereas the degree of
incompleteness in second-generation IIAs is considerably lower. 13 He
argues second-generation investment treaties should assist arbitral gapfilling in first-generation treaties. Likewise, Richard Chen argues that
investment tribunals should actively utilize contract theory. 14 For
instance, he employs the least cost avoider approach to help tribunals fill
the gap in the typical IIA to find the contracting states' intent.
In sum, previous studies either explain the economic logic behind
states’ behavior or provide interpretive tools for tribunals. The literature
has not yet described how incomplete contract theory applies to an
incomplete IIA. The next Part explains incomplete contract theory in
detail.
B. Incomplete Contract Theory
1. Reasons for Incomplete Contracts: High Transaction Costs
Economist R.H. Coase pioneered the transaction costs theory. 15 He
argued that any transaction requires different types of costs, such as
search or negotiation costs.16 He further explained that many contracts
would not be made if transaction costs were fully and completely
considered.17
Oliver Williamson subsequently refined the concept of transaction
costs, 18 defining it as the costs of negotiating a contract ex-ante and
monitoring it ex-post, as opposed to production costs, which are the costs
of enacting the contract. 19 Specifically, ex-post costs include the
following:
13. Wolfgang Alschner, Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts: Lessons from
Contract Theory (July 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2241652).
14. Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J.
INT’L L. 295, 298 (2015).
15. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 E CONOMICA 386 (1937).
16. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. & E CON . 1, 15 (1960).
17. See R. H. Coase, Notes on the Problems of Social Costs, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW 157 (1988).
18. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-32 (1985).
19. Id. at 21
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(1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment
. . . (2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex
post misalignments, (3) the setup and running costs associated with the
governance structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred,
and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments.20

Many economists accept this view. Therefore, the concept of
transaction costs covers (1) search, (2) bargaining, and (3) enforcement
costs.21 Search costs refer to the costs of finding goods and services, or
negotiating partners in the market. A buyer cannot obtain one’s preferred
goods unless the buyer expends a certain amount of cost to enter the
market, search for these goods and services, and find a negotiating partner
who sells these goods and services. In addition, bargaining costs refers to
the cost of hiring attorneys to negotiate complete agreements with
negotiating partners, such as the cost of hiring attorneys to negotiate and
draft agreements. Finally, enforcement costs are the costs of ensuring that
other negotiating partners comply with the terms of the agreed contracts.
Typically, enforcement costs are low when violations of the agreement
are easy to observe and punishment is cheap to administer.
Consider the world of zero transaction costs, where both contracting
parties enjoy perfect information of the world. In this situation, we can
expect a perfect and complete contract in which every contingency is
anticipated, and the risks are efficiently assigned because all information
is communicated between the parties. Each resource is allocated to the
party that values it the most, and each risk is allocated to the party that
bears the risk at the lowest cost. The resulting contract will allocate risks
and obligations perfectly and efficiently in every state, and the resulting
zero bargaining costs make it easier for both contracting parties to agree
on terms.
Unfortunately, perfect and complete contracts do not exist because the
transaction costs are never zero, and it is impossible for parties to foresee
every possible contingency. 22 Contracts also always require the search
costs of finding negotiating partners and the bargaining costs to complete
the agreements. In reality, a contract is always incomplete because the
parties fail to include all the relevant variables.23

20. Id.
21. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979) (suggesting
that transaction costs include: (1) search and information costs; (2) bargaining and decisions costs; and
(3) policing and enforcement costs. Dahlman points out that what these three elements have in common
is that they all represent resource loss due to lack of information).
22. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (5th ed. 2008).
23. ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (2006). For incomplete contract theory in legal studies,
see Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 C ASE W.
R ES. L. R EV. 151 (2005); See also, Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the
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In short, the presence of incompleteness is not necessarily indicative of
failure, inefficiency, or error. Rather, leaving gaps (i.e., leaving aspects
undecided) and renegotiating later is rational if today’s transaction costs
are high or tomorrow’s are expected to be low.
2. Problems of Incomplete Contracts: Opportunism

Scholars have approached opportunism in different ways. Judge
Richard Posner and Professor Victor P. Goldberg regarded
opportunism as taking advantage of another party’s vulnerability. 24
Williamson defined opportunism as “self-interest-seeking with
guile.”25 Professors Goetz, Scott, and Muris linked opportunism as an
attempt to redistribute an already allocated contractual pie. 26 For
instance, Muris believed that opportunism occurs “when a performing
party behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding of their
contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms,
leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer.”27
Incomplete contracts suffer from opportunism because of their
incompleteness and gaps. Gaps encourage contracting parties to
engage in opportunistic behavior.28 In other words, “when a party that
has the flexibility to adjust its performance in the future as conditions
change, it will always choose the best alternative option for itself, even
though the option may not be the best for both negotiating parties.”29
The following are relevant examples describing opportunistic
behavior. Parties use force majeure clauses to protect themselves from
natural disasters. But due to high transaction costs, parties may insert
vague and incomplete provisions in the force majeure clause without
specifically defining the term natural disaster. With this gap, either
party could later justify its noncompliance by a natural disaster.
Warranty provisions are another opportunistic practice. For instance,
suppose a seller and buyer agree on a warranty provision that states the
seller will use his best effort to fix a specific machine. Both parties
may want to leave a gap in the warranty provision because predicting
Theory of Contract Design, 56 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV. 187, 193 (2005).
24. READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 17 (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 4th ed. 1989).;
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89 (4th ed. 1992).
25. WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 47.
26. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA . L. R EV. 1089,
1139 (1981); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 M INN. L. R EV.
521 (1981).
27. Muris, supra note 26, at 521.
28. William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics
and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA . J. INT’L E CON . L. 996, 1009 (1996).
29. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 23 at 76.
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and calculating the nuts and bolts required to fix the machine is costly
and practically impossible. Here, if the cost of fixing the machine is
high, the seller has an economic incentive not to fix the machine and
argue that it did its best to fix it.
3. Solutions to Opportunism: Monitoring Through Comprehensive
Contracting and Bonding
Scholars have offered various remedies 30 to mitigate contractual
incompleteness and thus reduce opportunism, such as by delegating gapfilling responsibilities to a third party, 31 flexibility mechanisms, 32
relational contracts, 33 and so on. This Part introduces inter alia
monitoring through comprehensive contracting and bonding to avoid
opportunism.
First, parties can seek to minimize the degree of gaps by mimicking the
design of a perfectly complete contract. They may engage in complex and
comprehensive contracting34 by approximating, yet never achieving, the
ideal complete contract. To do so, the parties can devise mechanisms that
encourage them to act in certain ways to reduce gaps. For instance, in our
warranty scenario, the parties can insert observable information into the
warranty provision, such as a worker’s performance outcome instead of
their effort, to ensure the seller tries to fix the machine. Alternatively, the
30. Aceves, supra note 28 at 1010; SIMON A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND
ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 85 (2009).
31. Parties can delegate the task of filling contractual gaps to courts or tribunals. Courts presume
that rational parties expect them to engage in gap-filling in a way that the parties would have consented
to ex ante. This “would have wanted” approach is called the default rule of hypothetical consent. In other
words, courts should fill the gap in a way that the Pareto-efficient Complete Contingent Contract (CCC:
a contract that contains provisions for all possible contingencies that might arise in the course of the
contract’s performance) would have prescribed it. This approach is especially useful in the case of
accidental incompleteness or ignorance. However, when it comes to situations of foreseeable
incompleteness, the parties must provide the courts with detailed direction in the form of entitlement
protection rules or default rules. In fact, the “would have wanted” approach has two different types of
default rules: tailored and untailored. A “tailored default” seeks to provide contracting parties with “what
they would have contracted for.” An “untailored default,” addresses what the majority of contracting
parties would want. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); Goetz & Scott, supra note 26.
32. The parties can draft flexibility mechanisms that specify concrete contingency measures that
allow non-performance in pre-defined circumstances or that take the form of a general escape clause.
Simply put, contractors insert clauses that justify the non-performance of the contract.
33. The parties can execute relational contracts by using preambular language to set out the spirit
of the contract, which can serve as a reference point both for good faith performance and tribunals’
interpretations.
34. The term “comprehensive contract” was first introduced by Hart, who noted that under a
comprehensive contract “there will never be a need for the parties to revise or renegotiate the contract as
the future unfolds.” Just like the CCC, the comprehensive contract lays out a full plan of action ex-ante,
specifying all substantive obligations by the parties. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 22 (1995).
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parties could insert a monitoring device 35 to help the buyer check the
seller’s level of effort regularly. An agreement to assign the buyer a right
to check the seller’s video surveillance system during the warranty period
would safeguard against the seller’s ability to lie about its level of effort.
Bonding is another practical remedy to reduce opportunism. 36 The
parties may agree to post a bond in their contracts, an option they would
forfeit if they failed to abide by the contract's obligations. This solution
incentivizes parties to work harder to fulfil their obligations to avoid
forfeiting the posted bond. This often appears in employment contracts,
where corporations pay for employees’ children’s schooling, but if
employees resign, they must pay the schooling fees back. In this example,
the schooling fee is the bond, and employees have a monetary incentive
to be loyal to the corporation. Likewise, in our previous warranty
example, the parties could agree upon the term that states that the seller
can receive AS fees only if they successfully fix the machine. This will
encourage the seller to make the best effort to fix the machine because
otherwise, they cannot receive the bond—the AS fees.
III. TYPES OF INCOMPLETE IIAS
A. Incomplete Provisions in the Main Text
1. Missing Text
Missing text refers to IIAs with no substantive investment protection
articles, which do not commit to any investment protection obligations.
The China-Chile FTA is a good example of missing text.37 Both parties
spent years negotiating but failed to conclude any of the investment
protection articles, except for a single renegotiation clause stating that,
“unless otherwise agreed by the parties,” they will negotiate trade in
services and investment after the conclusion of the negotiations of the

35. Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. R EV. L & SOC.
SCI ., 279, 288 (2006).
36. See generally PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION &
MANAGEMENT (1st ed. 1992).; SE IL PARK ET AL., LAW AND ECONOMICS 186 (2nd ed. 2019) (available
in Korean. Written by Se il Park of Seoul National University, the first law and economics professor in
Korea and the author’s father. For more information, please contact the author directly).
37. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Chile, Chile-China, Nov. 18, 2005, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2712/download.
The renegotiation in the China-Chile FTA reads as follows: “Article 120 Future Work Program Unless
otherwise agreed by the Parties, they will negotiate trade in services and investment after the conclusion
of the negotiations of this Agreement.” Id.
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agreement. 38 The Trans-Pacific Strategy Economic Partnership
Agreement (“TPSEPA”) is another example of missing text. The four
parties to the TPSEPA (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore)
failed to agree on any provisions and promised to conclude the investment
chapter within two years from the date of ratifying the treaty.39
Similarly, the China–Singapore FTA is yet another example of an IIA
with missing text. The parties failed to include any new investment
protection articles, but rather merely incorporated a previously ratified
framework agreement. Upon the parties’ request, they agreed to consult
to further encourage the flow of investment between them.40
For the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement, there are no articles, except for Article 51, that deal with the
matter, as follows: “Each Party shall endeavour to, in accordance with its
laws, regulations and policies, create and maintain favourable and
transparent conditions in the Party for investments of investors of the

38. Id.
39. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, art. 20.1, July 18, 2005, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/4845/download
[hereinafter TPSEPA]. The renegotiation clause in the TPSEPA reads as follows: “Article 20.1:
Investment Negotiations Unless otherwise agreed, no later than 2 years after entry into force of this
Agreement the Parties shall commence negotiations with a view to including a chapter on investment in
this Agreement on a mutually advantageous basis.”
40. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Singapore, China-Sing., Oct. 23, 2008, Ministry of Commerce China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml. The renegotiation clause in the China-Singapore FTA
reads as follows:
ARTICLE 84 Investment
1. Upon the conclusion of the investment agreement between ASEAN and China pursuant
to Article 5 of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China (the “ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement”), the provisions of that agreement shall, mutatis mutandis, be incorporated into
and form an integral part of this Agreement unless the context otherwise requires.
2. Recognising that negotiations on the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement are ongoing,
the Parties agree to co-operate to facilitate the early conclusion of that agreement.
3. For greater certainty, any rights, obligations, restrictions or exceptions contained in the
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement that do not relate to either Party shall accordingly be
inapplicable under this Agreement. Notwithstanding Article 112 (Relation to Other
Agreements), in the event of any inconsistency between the ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement and this Agreement, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.
4. At any time after the entry into force of this Agreement, upon request by either Party, the
Parties shall consult with a view to further encouraging or facilitating the flow of investments
between the Parties.
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other Parties.”41
In the China–Georgia FTA, the parties agreed with a single article
stating as follows: “The Parties shall further assess and, if necessary,
endeavour to conduct negotiations with a view to revising the Agreement
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Georgia Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments.”42 Simply put, the parties have
agreed to revise the previously ratified and less ambitious treaty if
necessary.
2. Missing Articles
Missing articles refer to IIAs that lack important liberalization articles.
The recently concluded RCEP failed to include certain necessary articles.
For instance, the parties failed to conclude provisions on investor-state
dispute settlement procedures and the application of expropriation articles
for taxation measures that constitute expropriation.43 The RCEP members
agreed to initiate renegotiation no later than two years after the date of
entry into the RCEP Agreement.
In the investment chapter of the Korea–China FTA, the parties agreed
to renegotiation on the following provisions: definition, scope and
coverage, national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, minimum
standard of treatment, expropriation, transfer, performance requirements,
senior management and boards of directors, non-confirming measures,
investor-state dispute settlement, as well as other provisions. The parties
agreed to initiate renegotiation no later than two years after the ratification
date and endeavored to conclude the renegotiation within two years’
41. Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Japan and Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN-Japan, Mar. 28, 2008, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2570/download.
The renegotiation clause in the Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership Agreement reads as follows:
ARTICLE 51 Investment
1. Each Party shall endeavour to, in accordance with its laws, regulations and policies, create
and maintain favourable and transparent conditions in the Party for investments of investors
of the other Parties.
2. The Parties shall, with the participation of Japan and all ASEAN Member States, continue
to discuss and negotiate provisions for investment, with a view to improving the efficiency
and competitiveness of the investment environment of Japan and ASEAN Member States
through progressive liberalisation, promotion, facilitation and protection of investment […]
42. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of Georgia, China-Geor., May 13, 2017, Ministry of Commerce China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/georgia/annex/xdzw_en.pdf.
43. See supra note 2.
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time.44
The ASEAN–China–Hong Kong FTA is another relevant example.45
The parties decided to renegotiate their Schedules of Reservations in
Annex I, procedures for the modification of Annex 1, application of
Article 10 (Expropriation and compensation) to taxation measures that

44. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Governmentt of the Republic of Korea, Annex 22A, China-S. Korea Jun. 1, 2015, Ministry of Commerce
China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf. The renegotiation clause in the Korea-China
FTA reads as follows:
Annex 22-A. Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiation
B. Timeframes
8. The Parties shall commence the subsequent negotiations as soon as possible, but
not later than two years following the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
9. The Parties shall endeavor to conclude the subsequent negotiations within two
years from the date of the starting of the negotiations.
D. Guidelines for Negotiations for Investment
14. The Parties shall revisit all the Articles in Chapter 12 (Investment) with a view
to including pre-establishment phase of the investment covering all kinds of investment
including supply of services through commercial presence.
15. The negotiation shall include the Articles addressing Definition, Scope and
Coverage, National Treatment, Most-Favored- Nation Treatment, Minimum Standard of
Treatment, Expropriation, Transfer, Performance Requirements, Senior Management and
Boards of Directors, Non-Confirming Measures, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, and
other provisions.
16. The Parties shall include, in the result of the subsequent negotiations, an Article
on Performance Requirement with a view to incorporating high level commitment for both
pre-establishment and post-establishment phase of the investment.
17. The Parties shall negotiate on issues such as relevant consideration for, and
exceptions to the indirect expropriation in the subsequent negotiation.
45. Agreement on Investment Among the Governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People’s Republic of China and The Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, art. 22, ASEAN-China, Dec. 11, 2017, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internati
onal-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5655/download. The renegotiation clause of the ASEAN-ChinaHong Kong agreement reads as follows:
Article 22 Work Programme
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) Annex 1 (Schedules of Reservations);
(b) procedures for the modification of Annex 1 (Schedules of Reservations);
(c) the application of Article 10 (Expropriation and Compensation) to taxation
measures that constitute expropriation;
(d) the definition of “natural person of a Party”; and
(e) Article 20 (Settlement of Investment Disputes between a Party and an Investor).
[…]
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constitute expropriation, definition of natural person of a party, and
Article 20 (Settlement of investment disputes between a party and an
investor). The parties agreed to complete the renegotiation within a year
of ratifying the treaty.
B. Incomplete Provisions in a Reservation List46
1. Missing Reservation List
A missing reservation list refers to a situation in which the parties
conclude the IIAs without a reservation list.
The ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA exemplifies this. Here, the
parties failed to conclude reservation lists and decided to conclude the
lists within five years from the date of entry into force of their agreement,
unless otherwise agreed. These discussions will be overseen by the
Investment Committee, which is established pursuant to Article 17
(Committee on Investment) of the Investment Chapter of the ASEAN–
Australia–New Zealand FTA. Interestingly, the parties agreed that
national treatment shall not apply until their reservation schedules to this
chapter have become effective.47
46. As noted, a list of non-conforming measures under the negative list approach is called the
reservation list. This dissertation focuses on the reservation list under the negative list approach since the
list requires the insertion of domestic measures, whereas the positive list approach has no such
requirements.
47. Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia- New Zealand Free Trade Area, art. 16, Feb.
27, 2009, [2010], UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/tr
eaty-files/2589/download. The renegotiation clause in the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA reads as
follows:
Article 16 Work Programme
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) schedules of reservations to this Chapter; and (b) treatment of investment in services
which does not qualify as commercial presence in Chapter 8 (Trade in Services).
2. The Parties shall also enter into discussions with a view to agreeing on:
(a) the application of most-favoured-nation treatment to this Chapter, including to those
schedules of reservations; and (b) procedures for the modification of schedules of
reservations.
3. The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 within five
years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the Parties otherwise agree.
These discussions shall be overseen by the Investment Committee established pursuant to
Article 17 (Committee on Investment).
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In the ASEAN–India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement (“CECA”), the parties agreed to enter into discussions to draft
a reservation list and lay out procedures for its modification, indicating
that it must be completed within three years from the date of ratification.48
Parties in Korea and Vietnam also failed to conclude reservation lists.
They agreed to begin renegotiation immediately after the ratification of
the treaty and complete renegotiation within one year from the ratification
of the treaty.49

4. Schedules of reservations to this Chapter referred to in Paragraph 1 shall enter into force
on a date agreed to by the Parties.
5. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Chapter, Article 4 (National Treatment)
and Article 12 (Reservations) shall not apply until the Parties’ schedules of reservations to
this Chapter have entered into force in accordance with Paragraph 4.
48. Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, art. 6,
ASEAN-India, Nov. 12, 2014, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/3337/download. The renegotiation clause in the Investment Chapter of the CECA
reads as follows:
Article 6 Work Programme
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement; and
(b) Procedures for the modification of Schedules of Reservations.
2. The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, within
three (3) years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the Parties
otherwise agree. These discussions shall be overseen by the Joint Committee on Investment
established under Article 23 (Joint Committee on Investment).
3. Schedules of Reservations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall enter into force
on a date agreed to by the Parties.
49. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 9.12, S. Korea-Vietnam, May 5, 2015, UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/3582/download.
The renegotiation clause in the Korea-Vietnam FTA reads as follows:
Art 9.12 : Non-conforming measures.
5. The Parties shall begin negotiations on Annexes I and II immediately after the entry into
force of this Agreement with a view to concluding them within one year from the date of
entry into force of this Agreement:
1. (a) Articles 9.3, 9.4, 9.9, and 9.10 shall not apply until Annexes I and II have
entered into force; and
2. (b) The Parties shall make best endeavor to reflect the most advanced level of
liberalization commitments in the Schedules of their agreements on investment at the time
of the negotiations to ensure the overall balance of benefits of the Parties.
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2. Missing or Unspecified Measures
IIAs with missing measures arise when parties omit specific
information on domestic measures from the reservation list. For example,
in the Japan and India FTA, the parties failed to specify domestic laws in
the reservation list. 50 The measurement section of the reservation list
merely indicates “any existing or current regulations or measures.”
The Singapore and New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership (CEP)
is another example.51 Singapore carved out its policy space in the printing
and publishing, manufacturing and repair of transport equipment, and
power and energy sectors, but failed to identify domestic laws.
Likewise, in the TPP, in carving out marine capture fisheries, Malaysia
only mentioned the “Fisheries Act 1985 [Act 317]” without specifying
any sections or articles thereof. Failure to specify sections and articles of
the Act allows readers to interpret the Fisheries Act in its entirety as being
carved out of the IIA.
These types of unspecified measures in a reservation list may cause

50. The missing measures in the reservation list in the Japan-India EPA reads as follows:
Sector All Sector
Sub-Sector

Description

National (Article 85)
Most-Favored Nation treatment (Article 86)
Prohibition of Performance Requirements
(Article 89)
Any existing measures framed by the State
Governments/
Union
territories/local
governments are not subject to either National
Treatment, Most-Favored nation Treatment or
Prohibition of Performance Requirement
obligation.

Reservation Measure

Any existing or current regulations or measures
in force on the date of entry of this Agreement
51. Agreement Between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership, Annex
3.2, N.Z.-Sing., Nov. 14, 2000, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE,
https://www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz/search/details/t/2340. The renegotiation clause in the New ZealandSingapore CEP reads as follows:
Sector:
Printing &Publishing
Manufacture & Repair of Transport.
Equipment
Power/Energy
National treatment (Article 29)

Types of Limitation:
Legal Citation:
Description:
More favourable treatment may be accorded to Singapore
nationals and permanent residents in the above sectors.
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blurred boundaries between states’ investment protection and regulatory
power. For instance, in India’s reservation list in its Economic Partnership
Agreement (“EPA”) with Japan, it carved out regulations for the cigarette
and tobacco industry. However, the domestic legislation has not yet been
specified. Unfortunately, India’s Industries Act of 1951 contains a variety
of regulations for several industries.52 The cigarette and tobacco industry
is merely one of the thirty-eight industries listed in the schedule, including
the chemical, drug, food, commercial goods, and electronics industries.53
The failure to specify articles in the Act would allow a reader of the
reservation list to interpret the Industries Act in its entirety as being
carved out of the IIA.
Thus far, this Article has classified four types of incomplete IIAs. The
next Section applies incomplete contract theory to incomplete IIAs.
IV. APPLYING THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY TO INCOMPLETE IIAS
A. Reasons for Incomplete IIAs: High Transaction Costs
As mentioned above, the presence of incomplete IIAs is not necessarily
indicative of failure, inefficiency, or error. There is no complete IIA
because the parties cannot foresee every possible scenario that will arise
between investors and host countries. Rather, as previously explained,
leaving things undecided and renegotiating later is rational if today’s
transaction costs are high or tomorrow’s are expected to be low.
What factors increase the transaction costs of completing IIAs? The
first is the preference for protectionism; gradual or limited liberalization
increases the transaction costs of completing IIAs. Following the failure
of Washington Consensus policies (i.e., policies that focused primarily on
privatization and liberalization), many host developing nations learned
that market-oriented rules and regulations function only if their
institutional capacities allow. In particular, they realized that establishing
appropriate economic and legal policies (i.e., policies that reflect the local
environment and sociopolitical culture) were critical to the success of
further economic development.54 Thus, instead of rapid market openings,
Asian host developing countries are currently reforming their domestic
52. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, ch. 3 (India),
https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1951-65.pdf. The Industries Act has several regulations that
include specific ones addressing direct management, liquidation, supply, and distribution.
53. Id. The scheduled list is attached in the last part of the text of the Act.
54. See David Trubek, Law and Development 50 Years On (U. of Wisc. Legal Studies Research
Paper, No. 1212, 2012); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (classifying law and development scholars into two groups: those
who see law as an instrument of promoting development (law in development) and those who see law as
an end in itself and thus, pursue development reforms (law as development)).
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laws to match their local contexts for gradual liberalization.
When a government reforms its rules and regulations, line ministries
and the team charged with negotiating the IIA have difficulty gathering
data and pinpointing the laws that interact with the IIAs. Thus, they face
difficulties in determining the laws that should be included in the
reservation list, so that the IIA will not require further domestic changes.
Second, limited coordination and cooperation between the negotiation
team and line ministries is another problem that increases transaction
costs when completing IIAs. These involve simultaneous negotiations at
both the international (i.e., government) and intra-national (i.e., domestic
entity) levels.55 The negotiation team is responsible for gathering requests
and information from various entities, including line ministries,
legislative bodies, and public citizens, to draft an IIA that satisfies all
participating entities. Once the list is ready, the team attempts to persuade
negotiating partners as to why the list should be carved out in the IIA. If
the negotiating partner decides not to accept the list, then the negotiation
team returns to the domestic consultation phase.
The cost increases when line ministries do not immediately respond to
requests from the negotiation team. 56 Suppose the negotiation team
requests that the Ministry of Land review the draft of an IIA and send
them a reservation list regarding land measures. The Ministry of Land
frequently postpones such feedback, delaying the negotiation process.
Even if the negotiation team requires an urgent response in the middle of
the negotiation phase, the Ministry may fail to provide an immediate
response. Sometimes, ministries simply respond by stating that they agree
with the reservation list stipulated in the previously concluded IIA. It then
becomes the negotiation team’s job to look up the reservation list of the
previously concluded IIA and simply copy and paste it. Unfortunately,
this may be inadequate because domestic measures from the previous IIA
may have been updated or revised.
Line ministries are uncooperative because sending feedback on the IIA
is not their primary responsibility. Each line ministry has its own
prioritized tasks, and cooperation with the negotiation team is not its first
priority. For instance, the Ministry of Land’s primary function is to
examine the domestic land market and draft appropriate policy solutions
in response. Its main duty is not to modify a sentence or add another
reservation to the reservation list of an IIA during negotiations. This duty
55. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
56. For more information on the necessity of managing a ministry’s network, see R. Agranoff &
M. Mcguire, Managing Network Settings, 16 POL. STUD. REV. 18 (1999); DAVID L. BROWN, MANAGING
CONFLICT AT ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES (1983). For more information on reasons for the lack of
cooperation among ministries, see J. A. Weiss, Pathways to Cooperation among Public Agencies, 7 J.
POL. ANAL. & MGMT. 94 (1987).
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to draft the best reservation list is, in fact, a priority and interest of the
negotiation team housed under the Ministry of Trade or Foreign Affairs
and not the Ministry of Land or other ministries.
So far, this study has reviewed political, economic, and institutional
reasons for the increased costs of completing a reservation list. It is
important to note that the above reasons are related to asymmetric
information problems between parties, which further increase transaction
costs. For instance, completing the main text or reservation list requires
information to review the coordination between domestic markets and
ministries, which is only available to a country that aims for a carve-out.
The negotiating partner often has little to no information regarding the
necessity of the carve-out and related measures, which impedes the parties
from completing an IIA. Suppose countries A and B are negotiating a
reservation list, and A wants to carve out its land measure. To do this,
country A must review its domestic markets and pinpoint a carved out
domestic measure. However, if A faces a difficulty when trying to
complete the reservation list (e.g., due to ongoing reforms or coordination
problems among ministries), then B cannot do anything except wait until
A solves its own problems and is ready with its domestic land measure.
Reviewing domestic markets and preparing a domestic law with line
ministries are all within the boundaries of A’s private and undisclosed
information, and there is nothing that B can do to accelerate and complete
the IIA.
In sum, parties face various political, economic, and institutional
hurdles that increase transaction costs, and asymmetrical information
between parties further aggravates this problem.
B. The Problems Associated with Incomplete IIAs: Opportunism
Because of the aforementioned transaction costs, the parties leave gaps
in IIAs, which encourages opportunism for the postponement of
renegotiations. This Section explains the opportunistic behaviors of the
parties involved, as pointed out in the four incomplete IIAs mentioned in
Section II.
1. Missing Text
The missing text is an IIA without substantive articles. The main
text merely includes a single renegotiation article containing a promise to
renegotiate. This missing text allows host nations to opportunistically
maintain previously concluded treaties to avoid further investment
liberalization. Preserving the legal effect of previously concluded BITs is
often an attractive option for many host nations, especially when they are
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not ready for further liberalization. These host countries frequently
initiate negotiations for various political reasons and outside pressures for
liberalization and globalization, but their local markets may feel an
extreme burden to receive further foreign investments. In such a case, host
nations have an incentive to postpone renegotiation and stick to the
previously concluded one, with less liberalization effect. In fact, many
host nations that already concluded several BITs in the 1950s through the
1980s have recently signed bilateral or multilateral agreements to upgrade
the previous ones. Such postponements of renegotiations allow host
nations to enjoy the pre-committed level of liberalization and secure their
policy spaces on a pre-existing level.
2. Missing Articles
Missing articles, which occur when host nations conclude only on
certain articles, also give rise to opportunistic behaviors by host nations.
First, as with the missing text scenario, host nations would have the option
to retain articles of a previously concluded IIA. They could
opportunistically retain such articles and postpone further liberalization
by enjoying greater policy space. Suppose a nation fails to conclude an
expropriation article and decides to renegotiate. They then have the option
to renegotiate or retain the expropriation article of the previously
concluded IIA by postponing the renegotiation. If the previously
concluded IIA has an expropriation clause with some policies carved out,
it provides a greater incentive to the host nations to postpone the
renegotiation of such an article, unless they believe that they could
successfully carve out such a policy again in the current negotiation.
The ISDS presents another issue for which host nations might want to
postpone renegotiation. The Korea–ASEAN FTA and the recently
concluded RCEP have decided to renegotiate ISDS provisions. In fact,
host nations lack sufficient knowledge and background in ISDS
provisions and have little experience in managing ISDS proceedings.57
Handling ISDS is burdensome for many host nations because they lack
legal expertise in handling billion-dollar claims. They appear to prefer the
simplified version of the ISDS provisions (from the previously concluded
BITs) and seem to wait until they face the first few investor-state disputes.
Handling these disputes will allow them to gather legal expertise in ISD
proceedings and develop preferred forms of ISDS provisions.

57. See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulson, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern
Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 12 (2014).
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3. Missing or Unspecified Measures
Missing or unspecified measures may encourage parties to enjoy a
broad carve-out arising from unspecified domestic laws. For instance, in
India’s reservation list in its EPA with Japan, India may opportunistically
enjoy a broad carve-out from unspecified domestic measures. India
carved out regulations for the cigarette and tobacco industry, but the
domestic law was not stated as the “Industries Act of 1951 in India,”
which contains a variety of regulations 58 for several industries. As
discussed earlier, the cigarette and tobacco industry was merely one of
the thirty-eight industries listed in the schedule; others included the
chemical, drug, food, commercial goods, and electronics industries.59 The
failure to specify articles in the Act would allow a reader of the
reservation list to interpret the Industries Act in its entirety as being
carved out of the IIA. This broad carve-out may benefit India to some
extent because it allows India to maintain its rights over protective
measures. The benefit depends on the degree to which India requires
strong protectionism within the thirty-eight industries listed in the
schedule. Industries may still require discriminatory subsidies from the
government to remain competitive within the international market.

4. Missing Reservation List
The problem of missing reservation lists occurs when the parties decide
to include the main text without any reservation lists. This problem gives
the parties an incentive to postpone the legal enforceability of treaties. In
the New Zealand–Malaysia FTA,60for instance, both parties agreed that
NT, MFN, and non-conforming measures would not apply until the
parties’ schedule of non-conforming measures were entered into force. In
other words, even if the main text was concluded and ratified, important
investment protection clauses, such as NT or MFN, would not be legally
58. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, ch. 3 (India),
https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1951-65.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of
Malaysia, N.Z. – Malay., Oct. 26, 2009, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationalinvestment-agreements/treaty-files/2583/download. The renegotiation clause in the Malaysia-New
Zealand FTA reads as follows:
Article 10.17 Work Programme
1. The Parties shall enter into negotiations on Schedules of non-conforming measures within
three months of entry into force of this Agreement, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
[…]
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enforceable until the parties conclude the renegotiation of the reservation
list.
In fact, this may encourage the parties to opportunistically postpone or
defer the conclusion of renegotiation to maintain previously ratified BITs
with less liberalization. Pre-existing BITs are due until both parties
complete the reservation list renegotiation and ratification. This is another
incentive for parties to drag down the renegotiation process and create a
preparatory environment to accept an MFN or NT with a higher degree of
liberalization. In other words, if either New Zealand or Malaysia believes
that the MFN or NT is not yet ready, they have an incentive not to
conclude the renegotiation of the reservation list. Neither party has an
obligation to maintain the NT or MFN protection against incoming
foreign investors until they complete the renegotiation of the reservation
list.
C. Aggravating Opportunism: A Less Comprehensive Renegotiation
Clause
A less comprehensive renegotiation clause can aggravate opportunism
issues, as stated above. A renegotiation clause without a tight
renegotiation schedule and term that requires strong legal obligations
encourages parties to delay the renegotiation process. For instance, the
investment chapter in the CECA between India and Singapore includes a
renegotiation clause aimed at fixing the gaps in the reservation list.
However, the parties have yet to complete their renegotiations, although
more than fifteen years have lapsed. The CECA simply states that a party
“may” request the other to review the reservation list and reduce the gaps,
without using the term “shall,” to impose a strong obligation or put a
renegotiation timeline to the process.61 Similarly, India signed an EPA

61. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between India and Singapore, art. 6, India
– Sing., Jun. 29, 2005, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/2707/download. The Renegotiation clause in the CECA reads as follows:
ARTICLE 6.17: REVIEW OF COMMITMENTS AND EXCEPTIONS
1. If, after this Agreement enters into force, a Party enters into any agreement on investment with a
non-Party, it shall give consideration to a request by the other Party for the incorporation herein of
treatment no less favourable than that provided under the aforesaid agreement. Any such
incorporation should maintain the overall balance of commitments undertaken by each Party under
this Agreement.
2. As part of the reviews of this Agreement pursuant to Article 16.3:
(a) India undertakes to review its Schedule of Specific Commitment as set out in Annex 6A with a
view to increasing its list of committed sectors and reducing the terms, limitations, conditions and
qualifications on national treatment with regard to the establishment, acquisition or expansion of
investments; and
(b) Singapore undertakes to review the status of the exceptions set out in its Schedule in Annex 6B
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with Japan in 2011, and for the past nine years, it has not updated its IIA
reservation list with Japan. The EPA merely imposes that each party
“shall endeavor” to reduce gaps in the reservation list, without any strong
legal obligations or renegotiation schedules.62
Due to these less comprehensive renegotiation clauses, India may
behave like the seller in our warranty scenario. The seller promised a
warranty provision where it would do its utmost to fix a specific
machine, but if the cost of fixing the machine actually arose, it had an
incentive not to fix the machine and instead, claim it did its best to fix
the machine. Likewise, India could argue that it did its best to fulfill
the term “shall endeavor” to fix the machine but never actually fix it.
This is consistent with a statement by India’s negotiators in the RCEP
negotiations. They stated that they were trying their best to complete their
reservation list in the previously concluded FTAs but were not ready due
to ongoing legal reforms. They concluded that IIAs maintain their
reputation and signal to the international community that they are moving
toward liberalization. However, in reality, they still face legal reform
issues and thus are unable to complete the reservation list. In other words,
India argued that it satisfied its obligation to fix the reservation list
because the text only requires that it “shall endeavor,” even if it could not
fix it, and the transaction costs were still high, even at the renegotiation
phase. In sum, India’s high transaction costs due to ongoing legal reforms
impeded the country from sorting out its domestic law and completing its
reservation list, encouraging it to opportunistically postpone its
renegotiation based on a less stringent renegotiation clause.

with a view to reducing the exceptions or removing them.
3. In any other case, a Party may, upon reasonable notice, request the other Party for a review of its
commitments/exceptions:
(a) In the case of India as set out in Annex 6A - its list of committed sectors and reducing the terms,
limitations, conditions and qualifications on national treatment with regard to the establishment,
acquisition or expansion of investments; or
(b) In the case of Singapore as set out in Annex 6B – its exceptions with a view to reducing or
removing them.
Any review pursuant to such a request should maintain the overall balance of commitments
undertaken by each Party under this Agreement.
62. Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and India, art. 9, Japan – India, Feb. 16, 2011,
UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2627/do
wnload. A Renegotiation clause in the India-Japan EPA reads as follows
Article 90. Reservations and Exceptions
5. Each party shall endeavor, where appropriate, to reduce or eliminate the exceptions specified in its
schedules in Annexes 8 or 9 respectively.
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D. Solutions to Opportunism in Incomplete IIAs: Monitoring Through
Implementation Committee by A Comprehensive Renegotiation Clause
and Bonding
Comprehensive contracting is not a perfect remedy, but it may
encourage parties to actively participate in renegotiation to remove gaps.
The comprehensive renegotiation clause could strongly impose a need for
the parties to reduce the gaps by using the term “shall” and inserting a
tight renegotiation timeline. Moreover, the parties can establish a
monitoring device, such as a Committee on Investment or Implementing
Committee, to encourage them to avoid or opportunistically delay the
renegotiation. For example, the AANZFTA’s five-year term for the
conclusion of renegotiations binds the parties to complete the reservation
list within five years from the date of ratification of the treaty. 63 Without
a phrase like “shall endeavor” in the renegotiation clause, the parties
cannot argue that they made their best efforts to complete the treaty but
failed to do so. The term “shall” imposes a strong obligation on the parties
to complete the renegotiation.
Most importantly, the parties to the renegotiation are overseen by the
Investment Committee, established pursuant to Article 17 and known as
The Committee on Investment; hence, the parties annually meet and
discuss their progress toward removing gaps. The main purpose of the
Investment or Implementing Committee is not to renegotiate, but to
review the ratified treaty’s implementation. These Committees are held
annually to review the implementation of previously agreed and ratified
treaties. However, if the parties innovatively link these Committees with
the renegotiation clause, they would then have an obligation to annually
review and monitor the renegotiation, in addition to their original task of
reviewing the implementation of the treaty. In fact, many renegotiation
clauses in IIAs fail to link those with Investment or Implementing
Committees; therefore, the investment chapter’s working group
individually renegotiates the IIAs according to their own schedules,
which is prone to procrastination. In this regard, linking committees with
the renegotiation is an apt method of monitoring the renegotiation process
and avoiding any postponement in negotiation.
The Korea–ASEAN FTA is another example of a comprehensive
renegotiation clause using the term “shall” and linking it to the
Implementing Committee.64 It sets a five-year timeline to complete the

63. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64. The ASEAN – Republic of Korea Investment Agreement, art. 27, ASEAN-S. Korea, Jun. 6,
2009,
UNCTAD,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/3339/download. The renegotiation clause in the Korea-ASEAN Investment Agreement reads as
follows:

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss4/2

22

Park: Incomplete International Investment Law -- Applying the Incomplet

1110

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

renegotiation and establishes a working group on investments under a
joint committee. Renegotiation should be completed within five years of
its commencement. The parties used the terms “shall enter” to complete
their IIA, and the renegotiation was overseen by the implementing
committee established under Article 5.3 of the Framework Agreement.
However, these comprehensive clauses are effective only when they
outweigh the transaction costs of inserting the clause. The parties’ internal
status regarding ongoing legal reforms or institutional capacities can
affect the expected consequences of a comprehensive renegotiation
clause. India would still want to use “shall endeavor” to avoid strict
deadlines and maintain protectionism and gradual liberalization. 65
Comprehensive renegotiation clauses may result in significant costs if the
nation’s domestic markets are not ready to receive foreign investment.
Similarly, a failure in intra-governmental coordination may affect the
expected costs of inserting a comprehensive clause. If developing nations,
such as India or many ASEAN members, require an extended duration of
time (i.e., several years) to analyze their domestic law before they can
send feedback to the negotiation team, the negotiation team would prefer
the renegotiation clause to contain the words “shall endeavor,” to avoid
any strict commitments. In sum, a comprehensive clause encourages
parties to reduce gaps, but the clause is economically justified only when
the benefits outweigh the costs of applying it.
Bonding is another device that discourages parties from engaging in
opportunism. Parties may agree to post a bond that they can forfeit if
either party does not abide by the contract's terms. When applying this
logic to our context, the parties could promise not to apply a pre-agreed
Article 27(Work Programme)
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions on:
(a) Article 4 (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment);
(b) TRIMs-plus elements to Article 6 (Performance Requirements);
(c) Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement;
(d) Procedures for modification of Schedules of Reservations that will apply at the date of entry
into force of the Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement;
(e) Annex on Expropriation and Compensation;
(f) Annex on Taxation and Expropriation; and
(g) Article 18 (Investment Dispute Settlement between a Party and an Investor of any other Party).
2. The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred to in paragraph 1, within five years from the date
of
entry into force of this Agreement unless the Parties otherwise agree. These discussions shall be.
overseen by the Implementing Committee established under Article 5.3 of the Framework
Agreement.
65. The author of this article personally participated in the RCEP negotiation and India has been
arguing for this in the negotiation process. According to India’s negotiator in the RCEP, they placed a
partial commitment clause in their IIAs because they still feel that they are not ready to commit to higher
liberalization just to complete all the terms in the treaty.
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investment protection clause, such as MFN or NT, until they reduce gaps
in their reservation list. Simply put, one party could forfeit its preconsensus articles if the other party did not reduce the gaps. In the Hong
Kong–ASEAN FTA, 66 the parties decided that the MFN and NT
obligations would not apply until they completed their reservation lists.
AANZFTA contains a similar renegotiation clause.67 The parties agreed
to delay the NT provision’s application until after the reservation list was
completed. These triggering provisions could pressurize ASEAN to
complete a reservation list. Likewise, the Korea–Vietnam FTA agreed
that MFT, NT, performance requirements, senior management, and
boards of directors do not apply until Vietnam completed their reservation
lists.68
This bonding mechanism is a powerful tool to pressurize parties
because delayed renegotiations lead to delayed liberalization and market
opening. The major purpose of concluding an IIA is to attract foreign
investment. Such a delay is expensive for all parties concerned. Although
this is an empirical issue, the expected amount of foreign direct
investment inflow will be disrupted to a certain extent during the
renegotiation process. Domestic participants (e.g., stakeholders, media,
legislative bodies) who support market opening may criticize the slow
renegotiation process. A delay also puts pressure on line ministries
because those responsible for the completion of the reservation list block
market openings across all economic sectors. The negotiation team can
leverage this to motivate the respective line ministries to expedite the
process.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has applied incomplete contract theory to explain causes,
problems, and solutions of incomplete IIAs. It emphasizes that the
analysis can be extended to an FTA or other multilateral trade agreements
that contain chapters on goods, intellectual property rights, labor, the
environment, government procurements, investment, and services such as
financial, telecommunication, and electronic commerce services. For
instance, ASEAN countries and Japan commenced a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement in April 2005, and after 11 rounds of
negotiations, they failed to include any article; instead, they included one
renegotiation clause in their trade-in-services chapter. 69 In fact, each
66. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of India,
Japan-India, Feb. 16, 2011 (unpublished), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/epa201102/pdfs/
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chapter of an FTA or other agreement has incomplete or defective parts
that should have been specified in the negotiation phase but were not. All
such parts can be subjected to the analysis that we conducted in this study.
The incomplete treaty problem is a widely known phenomenon among
many treaty negotiators but has garnered little attention in academic
literature. Applying a legal and economic approach to these incomplete
treaties may result in valuable findings for practitioners and researchers
in academia.

ijcepa_ba_e.pdf. The renegotiation provision in the ASEAN-Japan CEPA reads as follows:
Article 50 Trade in Services
1.
2.

[…]
The Parties shall, with the participation of Japan and all ASEAN Member States,
continue to discuss and negotiate provisions for trade in services with a view to
exploring measures towards further liberalisation and facilitation of trade in
services among Japan and ASEAN Member States and to enhance cooperation in
order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of services and service
suppliers of Japan and the ASEAN Member States. […].
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